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: This paper assesses the situation and prospects of the OSCE (Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe) in light of the experience of the past few years and 
the ambitions the organisation set itself in its reform agenda. The analysis argues that, 
irrespective of how banal it may be, in the absence of a fundamental change in the 
attitude of the participating states it is highly unlikely for the OSCE to regain the role it 
once had. Either it continues to lose its relevance or at best muddles through as it has 
done since the mid-1990s. 
 
 
: The relative decline of the OSCE has been due primarily to objective factors. 
The European security agenda moved away from the traditional areas in which the 
organisation had a comparative advantage. This resulted in the need to adapt to changed 
circumstances and to the emergence of an imbalance between the various fields of the 
OSCE’s activity. Many current concerns the OSCE must address are related to 
governance and state-building. If the participating states cannot agree on the domestic 
agenda to pursue and their disagreement also results in efforts to spread their preferred 
model of socio-political order there is no chance for unity among the 56 participating 
states and thus political disputes will prevail. The problem of belated institutional 
adaptation is secondary to these factors. Hence, it does not induce processes that can 




 The OSCE and its predecessor the CSCE (Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe) have been well-established members of the Euhe Cold Wa
r, suffered from 
an inferiority complex due to the regular challenges posed by its partners within the 
Warsaw Pact. The human dimension was the concern of the West as it used it to open up 
the closed societies of the East and introduce some minimum standards of human rights 
for the benefit of those societies. The CSCE comprised a series of conferences that 
showed no signs of institutionalisation until the end of the Cold War. When it started 
adapting in 1990 it turned out to be a high-profile and highly successful institution. 
Temporarily, the CSCE gained a degree of centrality among European organisations. 
More often than not, it is the first half of the 1990s that is used as a reference when 
assessing the OSCE’s performance. 
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Factors of Success/Factors of Decline: The Change in the European Security Landscape 
The CSCE (named OSCE in 1995) had significant conditions for success in the early 
1990s. Many of them are no longer applicable: 
 
(1) The immediate post-Cold War era was characterised by major political uncertainty. 
It was a period when no clear answers could be given to the question ‘Whence the 
threat to peace?’.1 The CSCE, with its comprehensive concept of security, was 
best suited to address this uncertainty. 
(2) The CSCE did not accept that there was a sharp dividing line between 
international and internal affairs. Interference in domestic affairs was regarded as 
legitimate on humanitarian grounds. One of the main concerns of the time, the 
mistreatment of ethnic minorities, could be better addressed by the CSCE than by 
any other organisation. 
(3) The CSCE could address different phases of conflict. In 1992 it attempted to 
establish itself as an actor in international peace-keeping and conflict 
management. It certainly seemed more competent in prevention and eventually in 
post-confli
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activity to address various aspects and phases of conflicts and this has resulted in 
overlapping agendas regarding their management and resolution. 
 
• Advantage 4. Inclusive membership of the OSCE is most often mentioned as 
being a major advantage. It certainly is. However, the organisation’s 
comprehensive membership, extending to every state in the Euro-Atlantic area, 
also has a disadvantage. Namely, the OSCE, contrary to a number of major 
institutions of the developed world (the Council of Europe, EU, NATO, OECD, to 
name but a few) have gained additional legitimacy from the aspirations of 
membership of many countries. Furthermore, other institutions, such as the 
Council of Europe (46 members), the EU (27) and NATO (26) have absorbed their 
peripheries. In addition, it has been in their best interests to establish structures 
which create ‘shades of grey’ and help to avoid the perception of exclusion of 
states that are unable or unwilling to join them. As a result of these policies (eg, 
the Partnership for Peace and the European Neighbourhood Policy) the OSCE’s 
inclusive nature has lost importance. 
 
In sum, the OSCE has gradually lost all the comparative advantages it used to have at the 
end of the Cold War. The change in objective conditions has been accompanied by the 
revision of the intentions of its members, again partly due to objective reasons. The main 
players in Euro-Atlantic security can now decide which institution to rely on in order to 
solve problems. The region’s states, however, take into account the capacities of the 
different institutions, including how they are endowed with resources. As resources 
originate from the states themselves, it is also up to them to allocate them according to 
their political priorities. The three decisive players in Euro-Atlantic security –the EU, the 
US and the Russian Federation– seem to opt more often than not for institutions other 
than the OSCE. The EU, NATO and G-8 have become more important political 
coordination forums than the OSCE. 
 
The rearrangement of the European landscape has been the most important, though not 
the exclusive reason, for reconsidering the OSCE’s role. There are two other frequently 
mentioned factors: (1) the grievances of Russia and other countries of the former Soviet 
Union; and (2) institutional matters.2
 
Post-Soviet Dissatisfaction 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, its successor states have had to adjust to a 
series of adaptations. Establishing functioning national institutions and structures –to 
enable the electorate’s will to be expressed– and a market economy have been among 
the most important. Russia, contrary to the other successor states, has also had to adapt 
to a new status in the international system. It has had to accept that although it is no 
doubt a great power it is no longer one of the cornerstones of the international system and 
is now a junior partner of the West, primarily of the US. The process of international 
adaptation was aggravated by the fact that Russia regarded itself as the Soviet Union’s 
successor. Moscow’s desire for status was not immediately accompanied by a 
commensurate foreign policy. During the first half of the 1990s Russia seemed fairly 
undemanding and demonstrated weakness. In the second half of the decade it started to 
be self-assertive, collided with the West on occasion (NATO’s eastern enlargement and 
the Kosovo operation are cases in point) but it would be difficult to identify a consistent 
line beyond making itself recognised as a major player. The situation has changed with 
the coming to power of President Putin. Russia has concluded that it did not get enough in 
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return for its cooperative attitude. Moreover, the West helped with the democratic 
transformation of some states in the former Soviet area that Russia regarded as a direct 
challenge to its interests. Some of the means applied in the transition process were 
genuine tools of the OSCE, such as election monitoring and presenting claims on 
violations of human rights and democratic principles. Furthermore, Russia, due to its size 
and influence in the international system, provided political/diplomatic support and 
‘shelter’ to its smaller partners in the same area, which were similarly upset about 
Western ‘bullying’ for their doubtful and on occasion miserable democratic records. 
 
Russia and the other post-Soviet states had an ambivalent relationship towards the 
CSCE/OSCE. In the early 1990s Russia regarded it as the main regional cooperation 
framework and occasionally as a battlefield on which to fight for its interests. The CSCE’s 
importance for Russia and other successor states stemmed from the fact that it was the 
only regional institution in which Moscow and the others participated as equal members. It 
was then that Moscow wanted to subordinate other security organisations to the CSCE. It 
wanted it to become a mandating institution (along with the UN), with NATO and the 
Western European Union becoming mandated bodies. In the second half of the 1990s the 
situation changed due to two factors: (1) Russia gained a special status with NATO and 
gradually established its relations with other regional institutions; and (2) the West started 
to attribute less importance to the OSCE, as made evident by the lack of any summit 
meetings for five years between 1994 and 1999. 
 
The tension between Russia, its partners in the post-Soviet space and others increased at 
the beginning of the 21st century. There were two main reasons for Moscow’s 
dissatisfaction: that its earlier cooperative stance in the CSCE ‘remained unrewarded’ and 
that ‘its basic reform claims were thwarted’.3 The main problems, as Russia sees them, 
can be described as a set of imbalances. They are among the principles set out in the 
Helsinki Final Act of 1975, among the various dimensions of OSCE activity and the 
attention the organisation pays to various geographical zones of Europe. 
 
As far as the principles enshrined in the so-called decalogue of the Helsinki Final Act are 
concerned, a balance was struck between traditional principles of international law –such 
as state sovereignty, the prohibition of the threat and use of force and non-interference– 
and issues such as the respect for human rights and the right to self-determination. The 
balance held until the end of the Cold War. Thereafter, partly as a reflection of documents 
adopted at the end of the 1980s, in the human dimension the emphasis moved towards 
human rights. Not to the extent though, as some have mistakenly put forward, that the 
principle of non-intervention is no longer generally applicable to the OSCE.4 It is 
undeniable, however, that since the beginning of the 1990s participating states did not 
often refer to non-interference in the OSCE. If the relevance of the statement above is 
narrowed down to the human dimension, it could be regarded as largely correct. The 
invocation of the principle of non-interference again, as for instance Uzbekistan did after 
the Andijan event of May 2005, would be a demonstration that some countries are moving 
away from the value system that prevailed in the OSCE since the end of the Cold War. 
Here we arrive at a fundamental issue of the OSCE’s future: that it is increasingly 
apparent that the Europe –and Central Asia– of the 54 states that participate in the OSCE 
is not united around the same values. Although the overwhelming majority of participating 
states share liberal democratic values and implement them with some degree of variation, 
there are countries which do not: authoritarian systems or outright dictatorship extend 
from Belarus to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. This is reflected in their collisions with the 
OSCE. 
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As regards the imbalance between various dimensions of OSCE activity, it must be said 
that some degree of imbalance has always characterised the organisation. When the 
CSCE started its activity it had three so-called ‘baskets’: politico-military, economic-
ecological and humanitarian. These are now the three ‘dimensions’. There is one steady 
imbalance: the economic-ecological aspect has traditionally been weaker than the other 
two. As the OSCE is poorly endowed with resources to support economic development –
not to mention that it has a formidable rival: the EU– it will remain a marginal player in this 
field. During the Cold War the other two baskets/dimensions were balanced. This is no 
longer the case as a result of the decline of traditional security issues on the European 
agenda and the importance attributed to human rights and democracy/democratisation. It 
is underlined by the concept of democratic peace, according to which democracies do not 
fight wars (against other democracies!). If this assumption is correct then democratisation 
is the most effective peace policy. The result is that the human dimension has taken 
centre stage in the OSCE. As most of the participating states causing trouble are in the 
former Soviet area –increasingly including Russia itself–, this emphasis is not in the 
interest of most post-Soviet states. The more the western Balkans turns to peace and 
stability, the more the former Soviet area will become the focus of attention. 
 
The debates of the past few years revolved around the central element of democracy: free 
and fair elections. The OSCE has developed a high level of professional capacity to 
monitor elections and assess them and its assessments can significantly contribute to the 
legitimacy of governments –or deprive them of it–. Russia and its partners are in favour of 
a system in which the OSCE’s election-related activity focuses on normative aspects 
rather than on monitoring. One certainly would not exclude the other. A particular 
complaint is that a few hours after closing the ballot boxes the monitoring commissions 
publish their preliminary assessments and proclaim them urbi et orbi. The former Soviet 
states would understandably prefer to discuss the results of the elections in the OSCE’s 
Permanent Council, days after and often thousands of kilometres away from the capital of 
the participating state in which the elections took place. Although this is to the liking of 
neither old or new democracies there is an element of truth in the complaints of Russia 
and its partners: it is a strange system where the conclusions of the OSCE’s election 
monitors cannot be ‘appealed’ against. It is important to note, however, that the allegation 
that the OSCE election observation missions are instruments for regime change rests on 
a fundamental misunderstanding: ‘democratic changes of government are based on the 
result of elections, not on the observation of electoral processes’.5
 
The debate about election monitoring reached its peak when within a 15-month period 
there were regime changes following elections in Georgia and the Ukraine in 1993-95. 
Although this was regarded as a victory for democracy in the West, in the East it was 
emphasised that the changes were overshadowed by the manipulation of external forces. 
Two quotes illustrate the contrasting views: whereas the head of the US delegation 
applauded the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and 
emphasised that it represents ‘the gold standard worldwide in election monitoring 
practices’, at the same meeting the Russian Foreign Minister saw ‘the need for serious 
improvement in the work of... the ODIHR’.6 Although disagreement will continue to prevail 
regarding election-related activity, it is unlikely to be severe as it has been. The following 
factors should be taken into account: (1) a few years after the change in Georgia and the 
Ukraine the efforts to democratise countries has rapidly slowed down; Russia may find it 
reassuring that the transition of neither Georgia nor the Ukraine has been full and 
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irreversible; transition has not accompanied by rapid westernisation; (2) the West may be 
more doubtful about externally supported democratic transformation as the current record 
is not entirely convincing; (3) it is worrying that democratisation processes can flourish in 
OSCE countries where the power elites do not use brutal oppression, whereas it cannot 
prevail under genuinely dictatorial regimes. 
 
The OSCE, while rightly reluctant to relinquish its efforts to monitor elections, has 
expressed its intention to broaden its related agenda. Some of the new items have been 
contemplated for some time. ODIHR now plans to expand its attention to the evaluation of 
pre-election media, election campaign financing, electronic voting, voter registration and 
the coordination of observer missions. In the case of electronic voting, it should not curtail 
transparency and an additional commitment is to be introduced to that effect. The same 
goes for the financing of election campaigns. In order to increase public confidence, the 
provision of comprehensive and timely information and the education of voters should 
become the responsibility of the authorities.7
 
Complaints about the emphasis placed on the human dimension at the expense of the 
others will continue. Certainly, there is some room for adjusting OSCE activity and paying 
more attention to the politico-military and economic-ecological aspects. This has been 
taking place formally: several documents of the Ministerial Council and other forums 
address matters relating primarily to the politico-military dimension, ranging from small 
arms to de-mining through fighting terrorism, police cooperation and preventing the 
forging and misuse of passports. Occasionally, chairmanship countries identified priorities 
which were not part of the human dimension. The Belgian OSCE chairmanship of 2006 
was particularly innovative when it identified migration as an economic matter and 
transport as its priority areas. Although migration is certainly a multi-dimensional problem 
and transport –due to the problems with the economic dimension outlined above– is a no-
go, nobody challenged Belgium’s choices. 
 
The post-Soviet states have looked into the activity of long-term field missions and seen 
an ‘asymmetry problem’ in it as well. In a paper put forward by Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation in 2003, the four countries identified three 
problems: (1) the intrusiveness of missions; (2) their excessive concentration on the 
human dimension; and (3) the missions’ geographical asymmetry. It is untrue to say that 
missions over-emphasise tasks in the human dimension, as they are also active in areas 
such as water management, police training and cross-border cooperation, which can by 
no means be considered to come exclusively within the scope of the human dimension. 
Although I would not join those who argue that dimensions are entirely irrelevant, 
outdated or counter-productive, I would venture to conclude that the activity of missions 
increasingly provides evidence that the dimensions are blurred and no longer adequately 
describe the various categories of the OSCE’s activities. It is more complicated to draw 
conclusions as regards the intrusiveness of missions, partly because missions do not 
have identical mandates, and partly because the dilemma is largely one of perception or 
might be subject to political manipulation. It has to be recognised, however, that there are 
some known cases in which OSCE missions have extended their mandates by 
concentrating on observing and interfering with the host country’s internal political 
situation. Although the four countries have put forward concrete proposals to find 
institutional solutions for the problems outlined above, their primary purpose was to 
subject several matters related to missions (the appointment of heads of missions, 
budgetary matters, etc) to a consensus and thus increase the control over them by –
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among others– the host states themselves. If these proposals had been adopted it would 
have meant that host countries would have improved their bargaining position as far as 
mission mandates are concerned. It is certain, however, that the countries occupying the 
chairmanship still have a significant leverage over the missions. 
 
Russia’s third major complaint, related to both the OSCE’s missions and other activities, is 
geographical asymmetry. Missions are located in the former Soviet area and the Western 
Balkans and in the long run will probably focus exclusively on the former. Russia 
occasionally queried why the OSCE had not addressed the Basque issue, Northern 
Ireland or separatism in Corsica. Although at first sight the point seems reasonable it does 
not take into account that the OSCE’s activity is supposed to make up for the 
shortcomings of the participating states’ capacities. It is obvious that France, Spain and 
the UK have adequate capacity to tackle these matters. Thus they do not need help to 
address them. The OSCE’s aim is to contribute to building up capacities. It is a relevant 
point, however, that some missions occasionally do not represent the helping hand of an 
organisation of cooperative security, as they should. This requires a change of attitude 
rather than the arbitrary establishment of missions in parts of the OSCE area where they 
are unnecessary. For that matter, the establishment of so-called thematic missions –
covering certain issues in the entire OSCE area and thus diplomatically shrouding the 
geographical location of the problems– is not the way forward either. 
 
Nevertheless, the complaints made by countries in the post-Soviet area should be taken 
seriously, among other reasons because regardless of whether missions cover only that 
area or the entire OSCE, it is in the best interests of the participating states to avoid 
alienating the host countries. If a host country does not let the mission continue to operate 
on its territory the OSCE could continue to lose relevance. This was made clear when 
Uzbekistan left the continuation of the Tashkent OSCE in a limbo in 2005. It has to be 
understood that both the countries that intend to use the OSCE to build a security 
community of the 56 participating states and those that need help to develop their 
capacities, transform their political regimes or modernise their governmental structures 




When the series of conferences was replaced by permanent institutions in 1990, the 
CSCE’s participating states had one concern in common: they did not want to establish a 
regional United Nations with a complex bureaucracy. Their main aspiration was to 
institutionalise ‘lightly’ and on the cheap. To make a long story short, they established 
extremely small bodies and as needs emerged they added to the institutional structure. 
They introduced the position of Chairman-in-Office and with it an annually rotating 
chairmanship, a Conflict Prevention Centre and the predecessor of the Office of 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. In 1992 they added the position of Secretary 
General –as the chief administrative officer of the CSCE– and the High Commissioner on 
National Minorities and, subsequently, the Representative on the Freedom of the Media, a 
terrorism coordinator and the Representative on Human Trafficking. There is reason to 
conclude that the institutions established earlier made a greater difference than those 
established more recently. The process of adding institutions means that a broad range of 
horizontal organs existed without clear lines of subordination. More precisely, the idea 
was clear: to establish an inter-governmental organisation without any powerful 
bureaucratic structure. More than 140 people work in the Vienna-based Secretariat and, 
primarily in its missions, the OSCE employs more than 3,000 people. Until recently, 
participating states started out from the steadily less realistic assumption that political 
power is concentrated in the hands of the collective organs of the participating states 
(summits of Heads of States and Governments, Ministerial Council, Permanent Council 
and Forum for Security Cooperation) and in the Chairman-in-Office, the Foreign Minister 
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of the country occupying the chairmanship. The participating states have thus established 
an atypical inter-governmental organisation, which has turned out to be less functional. 
 
Due to the dissatisfaction of several participating states, the Chairman-in-Office for 2004 –
the Bulgarian Foreign Minister– decided to launch a process that could lead to institutional 
reform. Although it is obvious that the OSCE’s fundamental problem is not of an 
institutional character, the process has been going on for more than two years. It has 
brought strictly limited results. It has somewhat broadened the area of competence of the 
Secretary General of the OSCE, partly to make public statements to support political 
dialogue and more importantly to ‘bring to the attention of the decision-making bodies… 
any matter relevant to his or her mandate’. It is premature to conclude what the 
consequences of these additions will be, but it is certain that a very similar rule of the UN 
Charter made it possible for the Secretary General to acquire a major political role. The 
second decision of the OSCE’s Ministerial Council meeting of December 2004 on 
institutional reform established a panel of seven eminent persons who submitted their 
report in the summer of 2005, leading to the implementation of certain adjustments. These 
were the result of extensive debates that demonstrated that such small issues can now be 
resolved by OSCE functionaries. As requested by the Ministerial Council in 2005, the 
same body adopted new rules of procedure in December 2006 and a few other 
documents complementing them. The organisation’s foundations are not markedly 
changed. Decision-making continues to be based on consensus and none of the OSCE 
institutions have been abolished, but the way is now open to establish a few informal 
subsidiary bodies as deemed necessary and to terminate them when no longer needed. 
Although the Secretary General has acquired a coordinating role vis-à-vis other OSCE 
institutions, he has not acquired authority over them.8 All in all, institutional reform has 
been necessary but the results reflect the stalemate of a stalemated international 
organisation. 
 
 The country occupying the chairmanship and the Chairman, its Foreign 
Minister, have retained their decisive importance for the OSCE. It is not an easy job, 
bearing in mind that it requires constantly seeking compromises between the main actors, 
the US, the Russian Federation and the EU. However, a problem is that the EU maintains 
a relatively low profile in the OSCE and hence does not help to bridge the differences 
between the two main antagonists. If rather than being lost in inaction the EU could 
represent a value-based middle-ground position there would probably be more room for 
political compromise. The US, which under the current Administration is interested in 
changing the status quo globally, is playing a pro-status quo role in the OSCE. This is 
primarily due to the fact that it relies on other institutions and bilateral channels and hence 
would like to keep the OSCE where it is now: on the back-burner. The Russian 
Federation, which is defending the status quo in the world in order not to lose further 
influence and position, is anti-status quo in the OSCE. It feels that the OSCE undermines 
its efforts to consolidate and stabilise its own neighbourhood. Its emphasis on 
democratisation and election-monitoring may be too close to a liberal values and thus 
contrary to the interests of Moscow and its allies. 
 
A stronger sense of common purpose would be necessary for the OSCE to regain some 
of its lost gleam. As long this is not apparent to every participating state it will remain 
where it now is: in relative decline. 
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